


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# Space Weather and Impacts on GNSS Applications

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*Bob Rutledge*  
*NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center*  
*Boulder, Colorado*  
*October 8<sup>th</sup>, 2015*

NGS Webinar Series



<http://www.swpc.noaa.gov>

# Outline

- The Sun/Solar Cycle
- Significant Event History
- Sequence of Events
- Space Weather Phenomena/Impacts
  - Solar Flares
  - Radiation Storms
  - Geomagnetic Storms
- GNSS Impacts and Products



**NOAA**  
**National Weather Service**  
**Space Weather Prediction Center**

THE NATION'S  
OFFICIAL SOURCE  
OF SPACE WEATHER  
ALERTS AND WARNINGS




<http://www.swpc.noaa.gov>



# *What is Space Weather?*

Space weather refers to the variable conditions on the Sun and in the space environment that can influence the performance and reliability of space and groundbased technological systems, as well as endanger human health.




# Sunspots and the Solar Cycle

The Sun at Solar Maximum



2003/10/28 00:00

The Sun Today



VHM: Quick-Look Continuum: 20151008\_143000

*~27 day full rotation*

# Solar Cycle 24 Predictions


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Many of the world's premier solar physicists gather....



# Solar Cycle 24 Predictions


Solar Cycle 24 Sunspot Number Prediction  
Data Through 31 Mar 07



# Solar Cycle Update

- **Cycle 23** began in May 1996
- **Peak** in April 2000 with SSN = 120
- **Solar Minimum** in December 2008
- **Solar Cycle 24 Underway**


ISES Solar Cycle Sunspot Number Progression  
Observed data through Aug 2015



Updated 2015 Sep 8


NOAA/SWPC Boulder, CO USA

Sunspot Solar Cycles



- Large geomagnetic storms can occur with smaller cycles
- Some of the largest geomagnetic storms on record occurred during smaller than average cycles (no causality implied)

### The Solar Cycle in Sunspot Number



1859 Storm

1921 Storm

September 2nd





## THE EFFECTS OF GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCES ON ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AT THE EARTH'S SURFACE

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### ABSTRACT

Geomagnetic disturbances have affected electrical systems on the ground for over 150 years. The first effects were noted on the early telegraph in the 1840s and in this century magnetic storms have caused power system blackouts and phone system outages. Affected systems include all those that use electrical conductors: whether for transmission of power or signals or where the conducting properties are incidental to their use such as with pipelines and railway tracks. In power systems geomagnetically induced currents cause partial saturation of power transformers producing transformer heating and distortion of the ac waveform leading to misoperation of relays and other equipment. On pipelines, induced currents may contribute to corrosion but also present a problem with the electrical surveys of the pipe performed to monitor the corrosion prevention systems. Severity of these effects depends on disturbance size, proximity to the auroral zone, and the conductivity structure of the Earth. Also significant are system parameters such as the use of higher resistance coatings on pipelines and the linking of power systems into larger networks. In this paper we have attempted to catalogue all the published reports of geomagnetic effects on electrical systems and show their occurrence in the context of the solar cycle and geomagnetic activity variations for the years 1844 to 1996.

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### INTRODUCTION

On 13 March 1989, one of the biggest magnetic storms this century sent electric currents surging through power systems in N. America and northern Europe. The result was saturation of transformers, overload of equipment, lines tripped out of service, burn-out of transformers, and the collapse of the Hydro-Québec power system, leaving the 6 million residents of Québec without power for over 9 hours (Allen et al, 1989). These effects and the near-collapse of other systems have prompted a renewed research effort to understand how the geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) affect electrical systems at the Earth's surface.

Research into geomagnetic effects on electrical systems dates back to the last century and the early days of the telegraph. Varley (1873) reports on the aurora he observed in 1847 in the south of England and commented that, at the same time, all telegraph lines in operation in Great Britain were stopped by earth currents. He thought it might be said that this was the first time attention was fully drawn to the subject, and it was taken up not only by the officers of the telegraph company, but also by the Astronomer Royal. During a major storm in 1859 telegraph operators in Boston and Portland were able to disconnect their batteries and "for more than one hour they held communication with the aid of celestial batteries alone" (Prescott, 1866).

Telluric currents produced by a major magnetic storm in 1921 started fires at several telegraph stations in Sweden (Karsberg et al, 1959) and fire was again a danger to telegraph equipment during a major storm on March 24, 1940 (Harang, 1941). The major storm of August 4, 1972, produced an outage of the L-4 phone cable system in the mid-western US (Anderson et al, 1974). Submarine cables have also been affected by magnetic disturbances, and transatlantic communication from Clarenville, Newfoundland, to Oban, Scotland, during the magnetic storm of February 10, 1958, proceeded as alternately loud squawks and faint whispers

### APPENDIX: MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES THAT HAVE AFFECTED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AT THE EARTH'S SURFACE

- 1847, Mar. 19 Spontaneous deflections observed in the needles of the electric telegraph in England.  
 Sept. 24-25 It was noticed that the largest deflections occurred whenever aurora were visible.  
 Oct. 23-25 (Barlow, 1849; also see Varley, 1873).
- 1848, Occasion of heavy disturbances on the telegraph (Burbank, 1905). Matteucci remarked the  
 Oct 27-28 coincidence of aurora with interruptions in telegraphic communications, produced by  
 telluric currents (Angot, 1897, p 138).
- Nov. 17 Appearance of the aurora coincided with effects on the electric telegraph between Florence  
 and Pisa (Prescott, 1866, p 317).
- 1851, Sept. Prescott (1866) reports, "a remarkable aurora, which took complete possession of all the  
 telegraph lines in New England, and prevented any business from being transacted during  
 its continuance".
- 1852, Feb. 19 Brilliant auroral display observed. Associated with it were currents that burnt through the  
 chemical paper used with the Bain's chemical telegraph in the northeastern US (Prescott,  
 1866, p 318).
- 1859, Aug. 28 Mr O. S. Wood, Superintendent of the Canadian telegraph lines, says: "... so completely  
 - Sept. 2 were the lines under the influence of the aurora borealis, that it was found utterly  
 impossible to communicate between the telegraph stations, and the line was closed for the  
 night". Problems also reported by telegraph operators in New York, Washington,  
 Philadelphia, Vermont and Massachusetts (Prescott, 1860, 1866; also see Clement, 1860  
 and Gothenburg, Sweden (Rubenson, 1882). At all telegraphic stations in France service  
 was impeded during the whole of September 2 (Blavier, 1859; see also Angot, 1897).
- 1869, May 30 Out of the sixteen lines which terminated in the telegraphic office at Basle, six were  
 almost useless during the two hours that the phenomena lasted (Angot, 1897, p 141).
- 1870, April 5 Coincidences between aurora borealis and telluric currents in telegraphic service noted by  
 & Oct 24 Angot (1897), p 142.
- 1872, Feb 4 The telluric currents attained an extraordinary development during the aurora which was  
 one of the most extensive known. The disturbances in telegraphic communication were  
 not less extensive. In Germany all the lines were affected, and communication was for a  
 long time impossible between Cologne and London. Telluric currents were also observed  
 in England, France, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Turkey. Transmission of messages was  
 also prevented on submarine cables, especially on the line from Lisbon to Gibraltar, on  
 the line from Suez to Aden, and from Aden to Bombay, and on the transatlantic cable  
 from Brest to Duxbury (Angot, 1897; see also Arrhenius, 1903).
- 1872 - 1873 Earth current effects on Atlantic cables (Graves, 1873), wrongly attributed to earthquakes.
- 1882, Nov 17 Telluric currents observed in England were, according to Preece [Superintendent of the  
 Telegraph] five times as strong as the current usually employed in telegraphy.  
 Communication was interrupted as long as the disturbance lasted (Angot, 1897, p 143).
- 1891 Electromotive force of 768 volts was recorded on the Western Union lines between New  
 York and Buffalo, the circuits varying from 450 to 480 miles in length. On several  
 occasions the strength of the earth current reached nearly 300 mA, compared to normal  
 working currents that did not exceed 35 mA (Finn, 1903).
- 1892, July 16 Serious interruption of wire service in US (Sanders, 1961). Burbank (1905) gives details  
 of voltages observed on various lines, including 210 volts, about 9 V/km, on line from  
 New York to Elizabeth, N.J.
- 1894, Mar 30-31 Telegraph operators had been supplied with telephones and heard a variety of sounds  
 produced by earth currents in the lines (Preece, 1894).

# NOAA Space Weather Scales

<http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/>

Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Freq. (1 cycle = 11 yrs)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	

Radio Blackouts			
Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Freq. (1 cycle = 11 yrs)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	
R 5	Extreme	<b>HF Radio:</b> Complete HF (high frequency**) radio blackout on the sunlit side of the Earth lasting for a number of hours. This results in radio contact with mariners and en route aviators in this sector. <b>Navigation:</b> Low-frequency navigation signals used by maritime aviation systems experience outages on the sunlit side of the Earth, causing loss in positioning. Increased satellite navigation positioning for several hours on the sunlit side of Earth, which then moves into the night side.	
R 4	Severe	<b>HF Radio:</b> HF radio communication blackout on most of the sunlit side of the Earth for one to two hours. HF radio contact lost during this time. <b>Navigation:</b> Outages of low-frequency navigation signals cause error in positioning for one to two hours. Minor disruptions of satellite navigation possible on the sunlit side of Earth.	
R 3	Strong	<b>HF Radio:</b> Wide area blackout of HF radio communication, loss of radio contact for about an hour on sunlit side of Earth. <b>Navigation:</b> Low-frequency navigation signals degraded for about an hour.	
R 2	Moderate	<b>HF Radio:</b> Limited blackout of HF radio communication on sunlit side of Earth for tens of minutes. <b>Navigation:</b> Degradation of low-frequency navigation signals for tens of minutes.	
R 1	Minor	<b>HF Radio:</b> Weak or minor degradation of HF radio communication, occasional loss of radio contact. <b>Navigation:</b> Low-frequency navigation signals degraded for about an hour.	

\* Flux, measured in the 0.1-0.8 nm range, in  $W \cdot m^{-2}$ . Based on this measure, not considered.

\*\* Other frequencies may also be affected by these conditions.

## Radio Blackouts

Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Freq. (1 cycle = 11 yr)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	

Solar Radiation Storms			
Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Freq. (1 cycle = 11 yr)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	
S 5	Extreme	<b>Biological:</b> unavoidable high radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; high radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 100 chest x-rays). <b>Satellite operations:</b> satellites may be rendered useless, memory cause loss of control, may cause serious noise in image data, star trackers unable to locate sources; permanent damage to solar panels possible. <b>Other systems:</b> complete blackout of HF (high frequency) communications possible through the polar regions, and position errors make navigation operations extremely difficult.	
S 4	Severe	<b>Biological:</b> unavoidable radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 10 chest x-rays) is possible. <b>Satellite operations:</b> may experience memory device problems in imaging systems; star-tracker problems may cause orientation problems. <b>Other systems:</b> blackout of HF radio communications through the polar regions and increased navigation errors over several days are likely.	
S 3	Strong	<b>Biological:</b> radiation hazard avoidance recommended for astronaut passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes may require radiation exposure (approximately 1 chest x-ray). <b>Satellite operations:</b> single-event upsets, noise in imaging system reduction of efficiency in solar panel are likely. <b>Other systems:</b> degraded HF radio propagation through the polar regions and increased navigation errors likely.	
S 2	Moderate	<b>Biological:</b> none. <b>Satellite operations:</b> infrequent single-event upsets possible. <b>Other systems:</b> small effects on HF propagation through the polar regions; navigation at polar region locations possibly affected.	
S 1	Minor	<b>Biological:</b> none. <b>Satellite operations:</b> none. <b>Other systems:</b> minor impacts on HF radio in the polar regions.	

## Radiation Storms


Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Freq. (1 cycle = 11 yrs)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	
Geomagnetic Storms			
G 5	Extreme	<b>Power systems:</b> widespread voltage control problems and protective system problems can occur, some grid systems may experience complete collapse or blackouts. Transformers may experience damage. <b>Spacecraft operations:</b> may experience extensive surface charging, problems with orientation, uplink/downlink and tracking satellites. <b>Other systems:</b> pipeline currents can reach hundreds of amps; HF (high frequency) radio propagation may be impossible in many areas for one to two days; satellite navigation may be degraded for days; low-frequency radio navigation can be out for hours, and aurora has been seen as low as Florida and southern Texas (typically 40° geomagnetic lat.)**.	Kp = 9 4 per cycle (4 days per cycle)
G 4	Severe	<b>Power systems:</b> possible widespread voltage control problems and some protective systems will mistakenly trip out key assets from the grid. <b>Spacecraft operations:</b> may experience surface charging and tracking problems, corrections may be needed for orientation problems. <b>Other systems:</b> induced pipeline currents affect preventive measures, HF radio propagation sporadic, satellite navigation degraded for hours, low-frequency radio navigation disrupted, and aurora has been seen as low as Alabama and northern California (typically 45° geomagnetic lat.)**.	Kp = 8, including a 9- 100 per cycle (60 days per cycle)
G 3	Strong	<b>Power systems:</b> voltage corrections may be required, false alarms triggered on some protection devices. <b>Spacecraft operations:</b> surface charging may occur on satellite components, drag may increase on low-Earth-orbit satellites, and corrections may be needed for orientation problems. <b>Other systems:</b> intermittent satellite navigation and low-frequency radio navigation problems may occur, HF radio may be intermittent, and aurora has been seen as low as Illinois and Oregon (typically 50° geomagnetic lat.)**.	Kp = 7 200 per cycle (130 days per cycle)
G 2	Moderate	<b>Power systems:</b> high-latitude power systems may experience voltage alarms, long-duration storms may cause transformer damage. <b>Spacecraft operations:</b> corrective actions to orientation may be required by ground control; possible changes in drag affect orbit predictions. <b>Other systems:</b> HF radio propagation can fade at higher latitudes, and aurora has been seen as low as New York and Idaho (typically 55° geomagnetic lat.)**.	Kp = 6 600 per cycle (360 days per cycle)
G 1	Minor	<b>Power systems:</b> weak power grid fluctuations can occur. <b>Spacecraft operations:</b> minor impact on satellite operations possible. <b>Other systems:</b> migratory animals are affected at this and higher levels; aurora is commonly visible at high latitudes (northern Michigan and Maine)**.	Kp = 5 1700 per cycle (900 days per cycle)

## Geomagnetic Storms

# Periods with $K_p \geq 5$

June 2015


(Month 79)



# Periods with $K_p \geq 6$

June 2015


(Month 79)



# Periods with $K_p \geq 7$

June 2015


(Month 79)



# Periods with $K_p \geq 8$

June 2015


(Month 79)



# Periods with Kp >= 9

June 2015


(Month 79)



# Periods with $K_p \geq 9.0$



June 2015

(Month 79)









# Sequence of Events



2003/10/28 12:47




2003/10/28 00:18

Conditions are  
Favorable for Activity  
(Probabilistic Forecasts)




Event  
Occurs



Coronal  
Observations

# Sequence of Events




Analysis and  
Prediction

ACE  
Observation

Event Onset/  
Ground-Based  
Observation

# Practical Challenges




Issued: 2015 Mar 17 0030 UTC



Geophysical Activity Forecast: G1 (Minor) or greater geomagnetic storms are Expected on 18 Mar associated with a combination of the recurrent southern Pole connected coronal hole high speed stream (CH HSS) and CME arrival

# Event-Driven Product Definitions


- Watches; The conditions are favorable for occurrence
- Warnings; disturbances that are imminent, expected in the near future with high probability
- Alerts; observed conditions meeting or exceeding thresholds




# Solar Flares (Radio Blackouts – R Scale)



- Arrival: 8 minutes, photons
- Duration: Minutes to 3 hours
- Daylight-side impacts
- Probabilistic 1, 2, 3-day forecasts
- Alerts for exceeding R2 (only)
- Summary messages post-event






# Effect of intense December 2006 solar radio bursts on GPS receivers



Cerruti, A. P., P. M. Kintner Jr., D. E. Gary, A. J. Mannucci, R. F. Meyer, P. Doherty, and A. J. Coster (2008), *Effect of intense December 2006 solar radio bursts on GPS receivers*, *Space Weather*, 6, S10D07, doi:10.1029/2007SW000375.

# Solar Radiation Storms (S Scale)




2003/10/28 11:12

- Arrival: 10's of minutes to several hours
- Duration: hours to days
- Short-term warnings pre-onset
- Alert for threshold crossing
- Summary post-event




# Geomagnetic Storms (G Scale)



- 1-3 Day watch products based on coronagraph observations and modeling
- Short-term (~15-60 min) warnings based on measurement at ACE spacecraft


- Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) create geomagnetic storms
- Arrival: ~18 – 96 hours
- Duration: Hours to a day or two
- Creates ionospheric storms, geomagnetically induced currents, aurora





# Impacts on Electric Power Grid

- CME impacts Earth's magnetic field
- Fluctuations generate electric fields on Earth. These geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) can flow into power lines and transformers
- Leads to transformer saturation and over-heating, voltage drops, transformer damage, or protective device trips



Transformer winding failure



Transformer exit-lead overheating

# High Impact/Low Frequency Threat...


## **Media Release:**

Loss of Reactive Power, Voltage Instability Most Likely Outcome from GMD, NERC Report Finds



February 29, 2012

**ATLANTA – Loss of reactive power is the most likely outcome from a severe solar storm centered over North America, a report released by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) finds.**

**Significant losses of reactive power could lead to voltage instability and, if not identified and managed appropriately, power system voltage collapse could occur.....**



Ar  
System Sev




# Forecasting Space Weather Conditions for GPS

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
- High to Mid Latitudes
  - Primary driver is geomagnetic activity and the aurora
- Mid to Low Latitudes
  - A major driver is the lower atmosphere
    - Requires forecast modeling of the whole atmosphere from the ground to space

# Current Products: Regional Specification

**Current:**  
**US-TEC:** Provides real-time specification of Total Electron Content over the US



**Upgrade:**  
**North America-TEC:** Provide real-time specification of Total Electron Content over the North America (Operational ~2016)




# Data Limitations for Current Nowcast Products

- **Current products limited by lack of global data coverage**
  - **Need more data in the arctic**
  - **Need data over oceans**
  - Working to get more real-time GPS data from high latitude/arctic regions
    - Use of NTRIP to access more data
    - Plate Boundary Observatory

Air Force SBIR: Partner with USAF and ASTRA to develop a ground GPS receiver and data processing system that will work on ocean buoys

- NOAA Data Buoy Center will assist with design and deploy test models on the TAO Buoys in the mid Pacific


Developing data assimilation techniques to use COSMIC II data






# From COSMIC 1 to COSMIC 2

COSMIC Occultations: 3 hours



Comparison of sounding distribution over **three hour** periods between COSMIC and fully implemented COSMIC 2 is shown.

COSMIC-II Occultations, ALL S/C, GPS/Galileo/Glonass: 3 hours



## With COSMIC II

- 8000-12000 profiles per day using GPS and GALILEO as sources
- Average profile within 45 minutes
- Full vertical profile – deeper into lower troposphere

## Still Will Feature

- All weather
- Day and night
- No bias or drift




## For Space Weather:

- 0.001 TEC Unit relative
- Electron Density Profile 10%
- S4 index uncertainty – 0.1
  - (Scintillation)

Requires < 15 mins data latency for Space Wx situational awareness.

# Impact of a Moderate Geomagnetic Storm

**Moderate Geomagnetic Storm:  
Kp of 6 on a scale of 0-9, or  
NOAA Category G2**




**FAA Msg to SWPC:**

“An Ionospheric Storm began on 2/27/14. The Satellite Operations Specialists were alerted at the WAAS O&M by a Significant Event 757 at 2120 Zulu. So far, LPV and LPV200 service has not been available in Eastern Alaska and Northeastern CONUS. At times, North Central CONUS and all of Alaska have lost LPV and LPV200 Service.”

Note: LPV is Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance which takes the aircraft down to 250 ft altitude

# GPS IMPACT – U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)

- Intense geomagnetic and ionosphere storms occur on 29 and 30 Oct, 2003
- Acceptable vertical error limits were exceeded for 15 and 11-hour periods






# Products for Precision Applications of GPS

## Specification of ionosphere/thermosphere conditions that lead to GPS/GNSS errors and outages

- Rate Of TEC Index (ROTI) provides dual-frequency GPS users with estimates of scintillation
- NOAA SBIR: Partner with *Propagation Research Associates* to develop maps of scintillation for dual-frequency GPS error based on ground-based GPS receivers
- Test Product in 2016




ROTI: A Real-time Map of GPS Scintillation Likelihood

# Developing Global Specification Product

GAIM TEC


GAIM: Air Force Data Assimilation Model



GAIM time: 20142502345


DLR TEC

SWACI: German DLR Data Assimilation Model



DLR time: 2014-250-23-00-

CTIPe: NOAA's Physics Based Model



**NOAA is testing global TEC models:**

- Air Force GAIM
- DLR SWACI
- NOAA CTIPe available at <http://helios.swpc.noaa.gov/ctipe/>

# Modeling at NOAA – A Sun to Earth Continuum

## Partnerships with the Space Weather Research Community

Solar/Solar Wind

Magnetosphere/  
Ionosphere




Currently in  
Operations

2016


Ionosphere/  
Atmosphere

Earth's surface



2018

Location of 1D Earth Resistivity Models  
with respect to Physiographic Regions of the USA



2016

Electric Field Model



# Magnetosphere/Ionosphere

- In partnership with Community Coordinated Modeling Center, Geospace models identified for transition to operations:

- *U. of Michigan Space Weather Modeling Framework - Full physics-based magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) model*




- Provide regional specification and short-term forecasts of geomagnetic conditions

*Transition complete in 2016*



# Example Geospace Model Output

SWMF Geospace : Regional dB 22nd-23rd June 2015  
North American Sector




# Ionosphere/Atmosphere

- ✓ Implementing the Integrated Dynamics in Earth's Atmosphere (IDEA)/Whole Model (WAM) with University of Colorado
- ✓ Multiyear project to raise the top of operational GFS to 600km
- ✓ Couples ionosphere/plasmasphere prediction capabilities, with current weather prediction model
- ✓ Predicts lower atmosphere impact on ionospheric (and vice versa)

## Expected benefits:


- ✓ Improved forecasts/lead times for ionospheric conditions that can disrupt GPS & communications
- ✓ Improved terrestrial forecasts from upper atmosphere coupling



*Transition complete by 2017*

# Information Dissemination

- Phone Contact for Critical Stakeholders: NASA, Commercial Airlines, Power Generation and Distribution, FEMA, etc.
- Product Subscription Service: Email-based, no cost subscription service open to all
- Website: Data, products, and models all available there. Tops News heading that will provide updates for elevated space weather
- Facebook: Active updates and education, secondary to official product dissemination means. Twitter in work.
- Active Media Support during significant events



# *NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center Boulder, Colorado*



[www.spaceweather.gov](http://www.spaceweather.gov)



A night sky featuring a vibrant aurora borealis. The aurora displays a gradient of colors, transitioning from a bright green on the left to a deep purple on the right. The sky is filled with numerous stars. In the foreground, the dark silhouettes of several trees and a distant mountain range are visible against the glowing light of the aurora.

*Backup Slides*

# Satellite Observations

## DSCOVR

Operationally dedicated – Ensure continuity of solar wind measurements: Launch January, 2015




## GOES-R

NOAA's next-generation of Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Continuity of existing measurements, updated imager, inclusion of heavy ion measurements: Launch 2016



## Operational Coronagraph

- High priority to replace ESA-NASA SOHO/LASCO Coronagraph
- RFI issued in Feb 2014 for DSCOVR follow-on... Combines coronagraph and in situ mag/plasma



**L5 observation would improve forecasting**